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Abstract 
The NASA Glenn (then Lewis) Research Center (GRC) led 
several expendable launch vehicle (ELV) projects from 1963 
to 1998, most notably the Centaur upper stage. These major, 
comprehensive projects included system management, system 
development, integration (both payload and stage), and launch 
operations. The integration role that GRC pioneered was truly 
unique and highly successful. Its philosophy, scope, and 
content were not just invaluable to the missions and vehicles it 
supported, but also had significant Agency-wide benefits. An 
overview of the NASA Lewis Research Center (now the 
NASA Glenn Research Center) philosophy on ELV integra-
tion is provided, focusing on Atlas/Centaur, Titan/Centaur, 
and Shuttle/Centaur vehicles and programs. The necessity of 
having a stable, highly technically competent in-house staff is 
discussed. Significant depth of technical penetration of 
contractor work is another critical component. Functioning as 
a cohesive team was more than a concept: GRC senior 
management, NASA Headquarters, contractors, payload users, 
and all staff worked together. The scope, content, and history 
of launch vehicle integration at GRC are broadly discussed. 
Payload integration is compared to stage development 
integration in terms of engineering and organization. Finally, 
the transition from buying launch vehicles to buying launch 
services is discussed, and thoughts on future possibilities of 
employing the successful GRC experience in integrating ELV 
systems like Centaur are explored. 
Nomenclature 
AC Atlas/Centaur  
ADDJUST Automatic Determination and Dissemination 
of Just Updated Steering Terms 
CISS Centaur Integrated Support System 
CRRES Combined Release and Radiation Effects 
Satellite 
ELV expendable launch vehicle 
EOS Earth Observing System 
ERB Engineering Review Board 
FLTSATCOM Fleet Satellite Communications 
GFE government-furnished equipment 
GOES Geosynchronous Operational Environmental 
Satellite 
GRC Glenn Research Center 
HQ Headquarters 
IUS inertial upper stage 
IV&V independent verification and validation 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
KSC Kennedy Space Center 
LeRC Lewis Research Center 
LH2 liquid hydrogen 
LOX liquid oxygen 
RF radiofrequency 
RTG radioisotope thermoelectric generator 
SC Shuttle/Centaur 
SEP solar electric propulsion 
SOHO Solar and Heliospheric Observatory 
ULA United Launch Alliance 
1.0 Introduction 
The NASA Glenn (then Lewis) Research Center (GRC) led 
and managed several expendable launch vehicle (ELV) 
projects from 1963 to 1998, most notably the Centaur upper 
stage. These major, comprehensive projects included system 
management, system development, integration (both payload 
and stage), and launch operations. The integration role that 
GRC pioneered was truly unique and highly successful. Its 
philosophy, scope, and content were not just invaluable to the 
mission and vehicles it supported, but also had significant 
Agency-wide benefits that might also be useful to future 
NASA activities. 
NASA’s Centaur upper stage was the first of a new genera-
tion of space vehicles that pioneered the use of liquid hydro-
gen as a fuel for space flight rocket engines. The Centaur 
upper stage was developed by NASA Lewis Research Center, 
now Glenn Research Center1 in Cleveland, Ohio. The Centaur 
became the world’s first high-energy upper stage, burning 
liquid hydrogen (LH2) and liquid oxygen (LOX) to place 
payloads in geosynchronous orbits or provide escape velocity 
for interplanetary space probes. In combination with the  
1 On March 1, 1999 NASA’s Lewis Research Center (LeRC or 
Lewis) in Cleveland, Ohio, was officially renamed the John H. 
Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field (GRC or Glenn). 
Because of the historical nature of this paper both center 
names, Lewis (LeRC) and Glenn (GRC), are used inter-
changeably herein. 
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RL10 rocket engine (currently manufactured by Aerojet 
Rocketdyne), the Centaur became (and still is today) the 
highest performing upper stage and one of the most prominent 
launch vehicles in America’s exploration of space. Centaur 
has launched over 200 payloads, most notably the Surveyor 
landers to the Moon (a precursor to the Apollo lunar landings), 
the Pioneer and Voyager spacecraft to the outer planets, the 
Viking landers and the Curiosity rover to the surface of Mars, 
Cassini to the rings of Saturn, and the New Horizons probe to 
Pluto. Centaur has also launched dozens of communication 
satellites into geosynchronous orbit.  
The Centaur upper stage was developed and manufactured 
by General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Division (later 
renamed to Space Systems Division) under the direction of 
NASA’s LeRC. The Centaur Program started in 1958 with its 
first successful flight (AC-2) on November 27, 1963, from 
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. Since then the 
vehicle has undergone numerous evolutionary upgrades and 
modifications to improve its performance, operability, and 
reliability. Centaur has flown as the upper stage for both the 
Atlas and Titan launch vehicles, and continues flying today as 
the upper stage for the Atlas V. Last year (November 2013) 
marked the 50th anniversary of the first successful flight of 
Centaur. In the early 1980s, NASA embarked upon a large 
effort to modify Centaur to safely fly as a high-energy upper 
stage inside the space shuttle cargo bay for NASA missions 
such as Galileo and Ulysses, and certain Department of 
Defense missions. This program, known as Shuttle/Centaur, 
was cancelled in 1986 shortly after the Space Shuttle Chal-
lenger accident, just a few months prior to the planned first 
launch in May 1986. The Centaur G-prime upper stage 
developed for the Shuttle/Centaur program later flew as a new 
upper stage for Titan IV. 
This paper will reflect on NASA GRC’s unique and highly 
successful role in managing and integrating ELVs, with 
emphasis on the Centaur upper stage development and 
integration with Atlas, Titan, and the space shuttle. 
2.0 LeRC Philosophy on Centaur/ELV 
Integration 
LeRC’s management philosophy for launch vehicle integra-
tion was centered on having a robust and highly competent in-
house technical staff working in partnership with contractor 
personnel and the launch organizations. A true government-
industry team was developed in which each organization 
supported, stimulated, and challenged the other to produce a 
whole that was greater than the sum of the parts. The govern-
ment-industry team was highly experienced and dedicated to 
mission success, with considerable pride and confidence that 
served to maintain a high level of morale and motivation.  
 
 
Figure 1.—Centaur Program organization showing
LeRC-managed contracts (circa 1980). 
 
With its acknowledged technical leadership, LeRC evolved 
into a position of manager and system integrator of associate 
contractors, supplying the guidance subsystem and RL10 
engines as government-furnished equipment (GFE) to General 
Dynamics Convair as the prime integrating contractor. This 
mode of operation was well conceived and highly successful 
for many years, up until LeRC’s ELV program transitioned 
into procuring launch services from industry. Up until that 
transition, LeRC managed separate contracts with General 
Dynamics Convair (multiple contracts), Teledyne (Centaur 
digital computer), Honeywell (Centaur guidance), Pratt & 
Whitney (Centaur RL10 engines), and Rocketdyne (Atlas 
MA-5 engines). These associate contractors delivered flight-
qualified hardware to LeRC that was then furnished to General 
Dynamics in San Diego. Figure 1 shows the Centaur program 
organization in 1980 including the LeRC-managed contracts. 
The experience, depth of technical penetration, and familiar-
ity of the LeRC project staff with the Atlas/Centaur vehicle 
was a major strength of the program. This supplied both a 
“corporate memory” and person-to-person familiarity with 
their counterparts among the contractors (Ref. 1). As an 
example of this technical penetration and government-industry 
partnership, LeRC assigned a highly competent engineer to be 
the system engineer for the RL10 rocket engine and worked 
on a day-to-day basis with his counterparts at Pratt & Whitney 
and General Dynamics. This government-industry engineering 
counterpart arrangement was repeated for most every major 
system and subsystem (hydraulic, pneumatic, guidance, 
computer, avionic, structure, thermal, etc.…). This not only 
provided a tightly coupled government-industry team, but also 
provided the government with significant technical penetration 
into all aspects of the designs and hardware. It also served as a  
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check-and-balance system to assure mission success. Many 
times the LeRC system engineer was more knowledgeable 
about a particular issue, component, or design feature than his 
industry counterpart. Responsibilities of the GRC launch 
vehicle systems engineers, assigned as a technical specialist 
for a particular system or subsystem, included (Ref. 2) 
 
x Mission integration interfaces 
x Problem solving 
x Evaluation and qualification testing 
x Factory acceptance 
x “Tiger Team” product reviews 
x Flight readiness status 
x Launch support 
x Flight data reduction analysis 
x Flight report 
x Contract support 
x Liaison with contractor and Kennedy Space Center 
(KSC) counterparts 
 
Atlas/Centaur is an extremely complex vehicle with mini-
mal redundancy, and flight success required an unusual degree 
of both care and familiarity on the part of all system and 
subsystem engineers (Ref. 3). Flight failures were often not 
caused by gross design flaws but by things being forgotten or 
“slipping through the crack” (Ref. 4). 
 
“The technical penetration by the Lewis project team 
was more than just monitoring and directing the con-
tractors to ensure that they do a good job. When com-
petence in government meets competence in industry, 
a synergism occurs: the whole is greater than the sum 
of the parts. Each party stimulates and challenges the 
other to a higher level of care and diligence than 
would otherwise be obtained. The success of At-
las/Centaur could not have been achieved by either 
government or industry alone.” (Ref. 3) 
 
LeRC’s philosophy for Centaur mission success was also 
built on a foundation of extensive ground testing in the 
relevant environment—from components, to subsystems, 
systems, to the complete vehicle. Types of testing conducted 
included engine hot fire tests, separation, vibration, structural, 
etc… LeRC’s emphasis on ground testing, coupled with an 
experienced technical staff and unique test facilities were 
critical to the successful development and operation of the 
Centaur (Ref. 5). Figure 2 shows a Centaur upper stage being 
lowered into position for testing at LeRC. 
As problems arose, LeRC’s program philosophy was to 
maintain close contact with the contractor’s engineering and 
quality personnel for awareness and resolution. Engineering 
Review Boards (ERBs) were often conducted by both the 
 
 
Figure 2.—A Centaur stage being readied for testing. 
 
Figure 3.—LeRC Launch Vehicles Division
organization (circa 1980).
 
contractor and LeRC. Sometimes joint NASA-industry ERBs 
were conducted for particular problems. A very formal, well-
documented process existed for conducting business and 
reviews. Both industry and LeRC management were kept well 
informed of current status, problems, and problem resolution 
activities. Senior management was tightly engaged with the 
systems engineering and quality assurance personnel, to 
ensure no surprises. The engineering and project management 
organizations at GRC were within the same Directorate, not 
matrixed. This “stove-piped” organization was effective in 
focusing experienced engineers on solving problems in a 
timely fashion. Figure 3 shows the LeRC Launch Vehicles 
Division organization in 1980. Lower level organization 
“sections” are not shown. Launch vehicle staffing levels at 
GRC fluctuated around 100 to 150 people for the majority of 
the years. (There was a ramp up to near 250 people in the 
early 1980s for Shuttle/Centaur development.) In the early  
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1980s, GRC began augmenting its civil servant staff with on-
site engineering support contractors. Throughout GRC’s 
leadership of launch vehicles and Centaur, the Center 
maintained and staffed a resident office at General Dynamics 
in San Diego and later at Lockheed Martin in Denver. GRC 
also maintained an on-site presence at other associate 
contractor locations. Likewise, the major contractors main-
tained a local representative in Cleveland, near GRC. GRC 
staff also cochaired technical working groups and panels in 
key areas along with their contractor counterparts. GRC staff 
sometimes shared operational work responsibilities with 
contractor staff during critical launch preparation periods. 
Functioning as a cohesive team was more than a concept—
where GRC upper management, NASA Headquarters (HQ), 
contractors, payload users, and all staff worked together as a 
team, not as government versus contractor. 
LeRC’s approach to launch vehicle integration and mission 
success rejected the approach of contracting out all technical 
and engineering matters to industry. LeRC’s approach was 
much more than simply providing contract management, 
oversight, and insight. LeRC’s deep technical penetration into 
all aspects of the vehicle, an engineering staff comparable to 
the contractor’s staff, and working in close partnership and 
collaboration with industry, helped ensure a highly successful 
program for many decades. Attention to detail was paramount. 
The LeRC team brought hands-on experience coupled with 
equal-to or superior analytic tools and testing facilities 
compared with the contractors. LeRC’s trajectory optimiza-
tion, mission design, and coupled loads analysis tools are but a 
few examples of LeRC’s superior tools. The Center’s large-
scale vacuum chambers for hot fire engine and stage testing 
(at altitude conditions) of Centaur during its early develop-
ment were crucial to the success of the program. 
GRC’s philosophy for Centaur flight software was to design 
and structure it to be very flexible and “robust.” It could 
compensate for very large in-flight dispersions or even for 
some hardware anomalies. For example, it could initiate main 
engine restart sequences, recover from very high tumble rates 
after Centaur engine shutdown, and retarget in flight. The 
software was able to respond to many hardware dispersions or 
anomalies. Three examples of this philosophy are briefly 
explained here. First, if a Centaur main engine failed to start, 
software initiated a main engine restart sequence. This 
software capability was actually invoked on the first Ti-
tan/Centaur flight, a test flight where the Centaur engines 
failed to start after separation from Titan. The software 
initiated an engine restart sequence, but the engines still failed 
to start for hardware reasons. Second, in the event of very high 
Centaur/payload tumble rates after Centaur engine shutdown 
(i.e., during coasting) special software initiated commands to 
recover control of the vehicle, even if it meant that the vehicle 
rotated through 360° before control was regained. It had been 
shown analytically that this approach was preferable to 
running out of attitude control propellant trying to null the 
high rate quickly and then returning to the proper attitude. And 
finally, if on-board guidance and navigation calculations 
indicated that the desired target was unreachable because of 
some anomaly earlier in flight, a new target would actually be 
computed in flight using an onboard algorithm. This retarget 
would result in a compromised mission, (e.g., a lower orbital 
altitude), but such a mission was preferable to losing the 
spacecraft by running out of propellant before reaching orbit 
trying to achieve the original nominal target.  
3.0 Scope and Content of Integration 
As the NASA lead Center for management of intermediate- 
and large-class ELVs (such as Atlas/Centaur and  
Titan/Centaur), GRC was responsible for ensuring that the 
total launch vehicle and mission integration tasks and 
activities were properly coordinated and conducted in support 
of the mission (Ref. 6). These integration tasks and activities 
included the following: 
 
x Integrated launch vehicle performance and trajectory 
analyses 
x Integrated launch vehicle loads analyses 
x Integrated launch vehicle thermal analyses 
x Integrated guidance accuracy analyses 
x Launch vehicle guidance and flight control integration 
x Integrated launch vehicle radiofrequency (RF) analyses 
x Integrated launch vehicle range and pad safety analyses, 
including flight termination 
x Integrated launch vehicle range planning and data 
acquisition 
x Integrated launch vehicle operations support 
x Overall launch vehicle schedule integration 
x Launch vehicle systems trade studies 
 
A standardized integration panel structure was utilized for 
each mission. For most missions there were three panels: 
Mission Integration, Mission Design, and Ground Operations. 
For planetary or deep-space missions, a radioisotope thermoe-
lectric generator (RTG) panel was frequently required. All the 
panels were cochaired by GRC launch vehicle personnel. The 
ground operations panel was cochaired by KSC and GRC. 
Each panel had well-documented responsibilities. These 
panels were sometimes referred to as working groups. As 
shown in Figure 4, these panels were typically established 
about 3 years prior to launch (L-3 Years) for each mission. 
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Figure 4.—Typical mission integration process (circa 1996). 
 
The Mission Integration Panel, sometimes referred to as the 
Systems Integration Panel, was responsible for the overall 
management of the integration process, which included the 
following: 
 
x Systems safety 
x Systems effectiveness 
x Scheduling and planning 
x Action item review and status 
x Initiation/formation of working groups 
x Resolution of integration disagreements 
x Mechanical, electrical, and environmental interface 
requirements definition (flight and ground) 
 
Mission Integration Panel products included 
 
x Integration schedules 
x Safety documentation 
x Interface control documents and drawings, electrical and 
mechanical 
x Postflight reports 
x Flight certification assessment 
 
The Mission Design Panel was responsible for all aspects of 
mission design and operations between the launch vehicle and 
the payload/spacecraft, including 
 
x Assuring that all phases of mission design were con-
sistent with performance, trajectory, guidance, and 
launch period requirements of the mission 
x Providing a means for continual compilation, inter-
change, review, and evaluation of relative data 
x Interpreting performance and guidance accuracy re-
quirements and verifying that they were satisfied 
x Developing appropriate trajectory strategies to meet 
tracking and data acquisition constraints 
x Verifying nominal and contingency trajectory timelines 
and flight profiles 
x Supporting and providing inputs to interface control 
documents and other documents 
x Coordinating performance improvement studies and 
analyses 
x Developing and issuing performance tracking reports  
x Identifying and analyzing problems and determining 
possible courses of action and recommended solutions 
 
The Ground Operation Panel was responsible for defining 
facility interfaces and services as well as defining and 
integrating ground operations including payload encapsulation 
and scheduling of launch operations from the time the launch 
vehicle and payload arrived at KSC through launch. Addition-
al responsibilities included 
 
x Coordinating the preparation of all ground operation 
procedures 
x Verifying that all spacecraft ground support equipment 
is provided with proper services 
x Coordinating the preparation and approval of various 
spacecraft and launch vehicle program requirement doc-
uments 
x Reviewing and updating launch site schedules 
x Coordinating and communicating requirements among 
payload, launch vehicle, and NASA organizations 
x Coordinating launch site badging and security 
x Coordinating tracking and data acquisition requirements 
and services 
x Monitoring range safety activities leading up to range 
approval of mission flight plans 
 
For planetary or deep-space missions, the RTG panel was 
responsible for compiling and publishing a RTG safety data 
book in support of the environmental impact statement and 
safety analysis report. This included definition of launch 
vehicle accident scenarios, the resulting vehicle response, 
probability of occurrence, definition of environments resulting 
from accident scenarios, and identification of accident 
mitigation techniques to reduce the severity of accident 
environments. 
4.0 Payload Integration Versus Stage 
Development Integration 
There were two different aspects of launch vehicle integra-
tion at GRC: payload/spacecraft integration and vehicle 
development integration. GRC managed over 119 launches 
and integrated 80 different payloads or spacecraft with the 
Centaur upper stage. Beyond early development test flights, 
every launch vehicle (Atlas/Centaur and Titan/Centaur) 
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managed by GRC had a payload or spacecraft that was 
integrated with the launch vehicle by GRC personnel working 
in collaboration with the payload provider and the launch 
vehicle contractor. Payloads included commercial spacecraft, 
such as the Intelsat series of communication satellites, military 
satellites such as Fleet Satellite Communications 
(FLTSATCOM) for the Department of Defense, and many 
NASA planetary and solar system spacecraft, such as the 
Surveyor and Mariner series, Pioneer, Viking, Voyager, 
Cassini, and the Solar and Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO). 
Figure 5 shows the launch of Surveyor 1 on AC-10 in  
May 1966. 
The nature of payload integration was very analytical and 
closely coupled with the mission design, vehicle performance, 
and the trajectory. Payload integration included making sure 
the spacecraft physically fit (including fitting within a 
dynamic payload envelope) and interfaced properly with the 
launch vehicle and launch site ground support equipment and 
that the spacecraft would survive the environments induced by 
the launch vehicle during launch, such as temperatures, 
pressures, g-forces, loads, vibration, and acoustic noise levels. 
Payload integration also included making sure the payload 
requirements for services from the launch vehicle or the 
launch pad were understood and provided. Typical payload 
services included providing access to the payload (if required) 
after it was encapsulated inside the payload fairing; environ-
mental control (thermal conditioning, purge gas); prelaunch 
electrical power, data, and command; and other services 
provided to the spacecraft via umbilical connections from the 
launch pad tower to the payload. GRC payload integrators and 
mission integration managers were intimately familiar with the 
spacecraft requirements, interfaces, and environmental design 
limits and worked to ensure the launch vehicle environments 
were compatible with the environments the spacecraft was 
designed to withstand, with adequate margin. 
In contrast to the 80 payloads that were integrated by GRC, 
integration of launch vehicle stages happened infrequently. 
For Centaur, there were only four substantially different 
versions developed for launch on three booster families over a 
35-year period. These different Centaur configurations are 
commonly referred to as the Atlas/Centaur configuration, the 
Titan IIIE/Centaur configuration, and two Shuttle/Centaur 
configurations—the Centaur G and Centaur G-prime configu-
rations. 
A new Centaur configuration was a major undertaking that 
involved all the contractors and NASA. It was during these 
vehicle redesign efforts that the value and benefit of the joint 
industry-GRC partnership and collaboration really shined, as it 
did from the very beginning during the initial design and 
development of the Centaur upper stage.  
 
 
Figure 5.—Surveyor 1 launch on AC-10 (May 1966).
 
Centaur was born out of the necessity to have a high-
performance upper stage for the Atlas booster to launch the 
Surveyor robotic landers to the Moon as a precursor to the 
Apollo human landing missions. Centaur was the world’s first 
high-energy upper stage—the first to use LH2 and LOX as 
propellants, leveraging the remarkable and legendary RL10 
rocket engine as its propulsion system and ultra-lightweight, 
very thin, pressure stabilized, stainless steel propellant tanks; 
that were separated by a common bulkhead. Atlas was 
originally developed by the United States Air Force as an 
intercontinental ballistic missile. Derivatives of Atlas were 
later used by the Air Force and then NASA for launching 
payloads (and eventually humans) into space. The Atlas 
booster used a refined kerosene RP-1 fuel and liquid oxygen 
as its oxidizer. NASA used Atlas as a booster for its Agena 
upper stage and for the Mercury-Atlas human missions (after 
the two Mercury Redstone launches of Alan Shepard and 
Virgil “Gus” Grissom). Atlas was used to launch John Glenn 
and the Friendship 7 Mercury capsule on his historic journey 
in February 1962. Three more Mercury-Atlas missions 
followed. GRC pioneered the use of LH2 as a high-energy 
propellant and led the development of the RL10 rocket engine 
with Pratt & Whitney and the Centaur upper stage with 
General Dynamics Convair. Atlas became the first booster for 
Centaur, and GRC led the integration of Centaur onto Atlas. 
The first successful Atlas/Centaur launch (AC-2) was in  
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November 1963. Last year, in November 2013, many 
members of the GRC Centaur team gathered in Cleveland with 
their industry and payload partners and NASA senior manag-
ers to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the first successful 
Atlas/Centaur launch. Atlas and Centaur continue to fly today 
as the Atlas V ELV. It is not the scope of this paper to reflect 
in any more detail on the early development history of Atlas, 
Centaur, and the RL10 rocket engine. Those efforts are well 
described in the Taming Liquid Hydrogen historical book 
(Ref. 7). 
Examples of GRC’s contributions to the Atlas/Centaur 
integrated vehicle configuration included performing structur-
al dynamic tests of the full-scale Atlas/Centaur with a dynamic 
Surveyor spacecraft model at LeRC’s E Stand at Plum Brook 
Station in the 1960s. These tests verified the dynamic models 
for loads, pogo, and autopilot stability analysis. Also in the 
1960s GRC developed the Atlas vehicle ground wind damper 
and the linear-shaped charge for the separation system that 
separated Centaur from Atlas. GRC was also instrumental in 
the development of a new Atlas/Centaur nose fairing and 
fairing jettison system, which were tested at LeRC’s Space 
Power Facility at Plum Brook, the world’s largest vacuum 
chamber. In the 1970s GRC led the development of a comput-
er-controlled Centaur tank pressurization and vent system as 
well as the computer-controlled launch set (CCLS), the 
ground-based computer system used to monitor, calibrate, test, 
and display system status and redlines prior to launch. Another 
significant GRC accomplishment was the development, in 
close collaboration with General Dynamics, of a new launch-
day wind-monitoring and vehicle-steering system in 1973 
known as Automatic Determination and Dissemination of Just 
Updated Steering Terms (ADDJUST). The premise of 
ADDJUST was to use high-altitude wind data from weather 
balloons launched just prior to launch to provide up-to-date 
vehicle guidance and steering (pitch and yaw) parameters to 
the Centaur flight control computer 15-minutes before launch 
to steer the vehicle through the winds to minimize loads on the 
vehicle during ascent. The ADDJUST system dramatically 
reduced the number of launch scrubs due to upper-atmosphere 
winds and increased the number of days available for 
launch—especially during the winter season of high-upper-
atmosphere winds in Florida. 
The Titan IIIE/Centaur D-1T configuration, developed in 
the early 1970s, had triple the payload capability of At-
las/Centaur. The development of Titan/Centaur was driven by 
the need to launch the heavy Viking landers to Mars in 1975. 
After its maiden test flight in February 1974 (which ended in 
failure when the Centaur RL10 engines failed to start), Titan 
IIIE/Centaur flew successfully six times, launching Viking 1  
 
 
Figure 6.—Titan IIIE/Centaur launch of Voyager 2 (1977).
 
and 2, Voyager 1 and 2, and Helios 1 and 2. The last Titan 
IIIE/Centaur launch was Voyager 1 in September 1977.2
Integrating Centaur with Titan proved to be a significant 
technical challenge. It required integrating together two 
vehicles, each with their own major aerospace company—
General Dynamic’s Centaur with Martin Marietta’s Titan. 
Further complicating matters was the Air Force’s ownership 
and control of Titan IIIE and the Complex 41 launch pad and 
other Titan facilities at Cape Canaveral. GRC stepped up to 
lead the integration of Titan/Centaur, working in partnership 
with General Dynamics, Martin Marietta, KSC, and the Air 
Force. Figure 6 shows the launch of Voyager 2 in 1977. 
GRC’s contributions to integrating Centaur with Titan IIIE 
included 
 
x Leading the integration efforts with the aerospace con-
tractors, KSC and the Air Force 
x Development of the Titan Stage 1 oxidizer pogo sup-
pression accumulator system 
x Integrating the ADDJUST system into Titan/Centaur. (All 
seven Titan IIIE/Centaur launches used ADDJUST.) 
 
2 Voyager 2 was launched 16 days before Voyager 1. 
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x Development of a new payload shroud (Centaur Stand-
ard Shroud) for Titan/Centaur, including performing 
shroud jettison tests, including thermal vacuum tests, at 
Plum Brook 
x Development of the Centaur guidance system to guide, 
steer, and control Titan, using the Centaur digital com-
puter and avionics systems 
x Development of a Centaur thermal radiation shield to 
enable in-space coasts for much longer periods (up to 
5 h) than Atlas/Centaur. (Although developed and 
demonstrated on Helios, this capability was never need-
ed or used for a mission.) 
 
Another challenge in integrating Centuar with Titan IIIE 
was the lack of clear and effective technical communication 
between the two major aerospace companies involved. The 
LeRC integration manager directed that a common database 
and set of definitions be established, documented, and 
maintained as the governing interface control drawings for the 
integration activity. This was no minor task because the two 
companies had differing cultures and design processes.8 In 
addition he directed that a complete structural and structural-
dynamics analyses be conducted for the combined vehicle. 
This effort underscored the nature of the integration problems 
because the two companies did not use a common set of 
definitions for such analyses. The different cultures of Atlas 
and Titan programs proved a challenge for LeRC project 
managers. Air Force personnel were rotated every few years, a 
practice that prevented them from forming close personal 
relationships with their counterparts at Martin Marietta. In 
contrast, years of working together had produced a seamless 
relationship between LeRC and General Dynamics people 
(Ref. 9). 
The final major new Centaur configuration led and integrat-
ed by GRC was Shuttle/Centaur. In the early 1980s, NASA 
embarked upon a large effort to modify Centaur to fly safely 
as a high-energy upper stage inside the space shuttle cargo bay 
for NASA missions such as Galileo and Ulysses as well as 
certain Department of Defense missions. It is important to 
note that Shuttle/Centaur was very political in nature and that 
it began at around the time of the first space shuttle launch in 
1981. At the beginning, Shuttle/Centaur was a political “hot 
potato” with the Agency cancelling it only to have Congress 
reinstate it. To better understand this, it is important to 
understand the environment of the late 1970s and early 
1980s—the dawn of the space shuttle era and a tumultuous 
time for ELVs and Centaur. 
With the development of the space shuttle, which began in 
1972, it became NASA’s official policy to terminate the use of 
all ELVs as soon as the space shuttle became available. As a 
result, for several years before the first space shuttle flight in 
1981, the Atlas/Centaur program and the GRC-industry team 
was living and operating in a phase-out environment—an 
environment of near-term termination. In 1979 it appeared that 
AC-60, scheduled to launch in 1981, would be the very last 
Atlas/Centaur launch and the final Centaur mission. Around 
that time, the launch vehicle staff at GRC was reduced and 
planning was initiated to carry out the remaining launches in 
an orderly fashion and begin to phase-out all other engineering 
and sustaining activities (Ref. 10). However in 1980, concern 
with space shuttle delays resulted in Intelsat requesting four 
more Atlas/Centaur launches that promised to extend the life 
of Atlas/Centaur for at least 4 years. The program continued 
along with no long-range prospects and only being able to 
manage one or two missions at a time as they came to be. An 
attitude that NASA would allow the possible coexistence of 
ELVs with the space shuttle started to emerge with a recom-
mendation by the Atlas/Centaur Review Board in February 
1981 that this become NASA policy (Ref. 11) During this 
same time period, the Europeans entered the ELV market with 
their brand new Ariane launch vehicle. Ariane soon became a 
viable and competitive launch vehicle in the international 
market, creating additional pressures on the United States 
launch vehicle industry to remain competitive in a market they 
once dominated. This was the beginning of a shift towards 
recognizing the need for a robust, competitive, commercial 
space transportation industry, and the move towards commer-
cializing ELVs in the United States began. This also marked 
the beginning of a shift within NASA from managing and 
buying ELVs (like Delta and Atlas/Centaur) to procuring 
launch services from industry. It would take several more 
years for this transition to occur, and GRC was at the forefront 
of making it happen. This transition from launch vehicles to 
launch services will be discussed in Section 5.0 of this paper. 
During this same time period (early 1981), as the space 
shuttle began to fly, it became apparent that the space shuttle 
needed a capability to launch payloads beyond low Earth 
orbit. The idea to redesign Centaur to fit inside the space 
shuttle was a radical idea that had been considered and studied 
in the 1970s, with a large integration study authorized by 
NASA HQ in 1979. The Shuttle/Centaur Program began in 
1981 (albeit with low funding and an “on-again/off-again” 
first couple of years) and was hailed as the “convergence of 
piloted and robotic spacecraft and the next step in launch 
vehicle evolution. In an era of cost cutting and declining space 
budgets, the combination of the shuttle with the world’s most 
powerful upper stage promised to give the United States a 
system of extraordinary power and versatility” (Ref. 12). 
There was also at the time a competing upper stage concept 
for the shuttle, the Air Force’s solid propellant inertial upper 
stage (IUS) built by Boeing. A bitter political debate ensued 
between IUS camps (including Marshall Space Flight Center 
and its powerful delegation) and Centaur camps. 
Unfortunately, Shuttle/Centaur was fraught with controver-
sy and Agency and inter-center politics. Centaur was managed 
as shuttle payload, as opposed to an element of the Space 
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Transportation System. The mass of a fully tanked Centaur 
with its payload stretched the abort landing capabilities of the 
shuttle orbiter. This necessitated designing a complex 
propellant dump system to quickly dump the liquid hydrogen 
and liquid oxygen from the Centaur in the event of an 
emergency abort landing to reduce mass. There were numer-
ous safety concerns associated with flying hydrogen and 
oxygen inside the cargo bay of the shuttle in close proximity 
to the crew and their only ride home—especially with these 
propellants stored inside the Centaur’s balloon-like pressure-
stabilized tanks. In spite of those safety concerns, all the 
required safety precautions were addressed and all necessary 
emergency systems and redundancy plans were in place. In 
January 1986, Shuttle/Centaur SC-1 and SC-2 were only 
4 months from launch (scheduled to launch 6 days apart in 
May 1986) and ready to be installed inside the Space Shuttle 
Challenger cargo bay for the Ulysses mission (SC-1) to the 
Sun and Space Shuttle Atlantis for the Galileo mission (SC-2) 
to Jupiter. However on January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle 
Challenger tragically and catastrophically failed during launch 
and everything changed. The Agency became very risk 
adverse. The shuttle program was shut down for almost  
3 years. The Shuttle/Centaur program was not officially 
terminated until June 19, 1986, but its uncertainty and fate 
were largely known soon after the Challenger accident. 
Figure 7 shows artist concepts of Centaur G-prime being 
deployed from the Shuttle cargo bay with the Galileo space-
craft payload. 
GRC comanaged the development of Shuttle/Centaur with 
the Air Force. Although there was low-level, “on-again, off-
again” activity and funding in 1981 and 1982, the program did 
not have significant funding and stability until 1983—only 
3 years before the firmly scheduled first launch in May 1986. 
Meeting this schedule was critical for the program. The 
Galileo mission to Jupiter had to be launched within a 21-day 
window that month, or be delayed for over a year. GRC 
created the Shuttle/Centaur Project Office and hired additional 
staff. Launch vehicle staffing at GRC doubled to around 250 
people in the mid-1980s during the peak of Shuttle/Centaur 
development. The Air Force maintained an on-site staff at 
GRC and was an integral, vital part of the Shuttle/Centaur 
Project Office. Together GRC and the Air Force comanaged 
the program including the integration of Centaur design and 
configuration changes to adapt the vehicle for the space shuttle 
platform and to ensure that Centaur addressed all human space 
flight requirements.  
There were two versions or configurations of Centaur 
developed for the shuttle: Centaur G and Centaur G-prime. 
The G-prime version was 30 ft long to accommodate 30-ft 
long payloads. The G version was 20 ft long and could 
accommodate payloads up to 40 ft long. This was a result of 
different requirements for NASA missions versus Air Force 
missions. NASA’s requirements were for a larger upper stage 
 
 
Figure 7.—Artist concept of Shuttle/Centaur (with Galileo 
spacecraft) deployment from shuttle.
 
with the energy to achieve interplanetary velocity require-
ments. The Air Force requirements were for larger/longer 
payloads (40 ft) for Earth orbital missions. Both versions of 
Centaur were cradled inside the shuttle cargo bay in a device 
known as the Centaur Integrated Support System (CISS). The 
CISS was a major new systems development activity for the 
program. The CISS provided all of the mechanical, electrical, 
and fluid interfaces between the Centaur and the shuttle. The 
CISS not only supported the Centaur during space shuttle 
flights, it also provided the means to control and deploy the 
Centaur. With the cargo bay doors open, the CISS would 
rotate (pivot) the Centaur up and out of the cargo bay and then 
release it. The CISS was designed to be reusable and returned 
to Earth inside the shuttle cargo bay. Both versions of Centaur  
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Figure 8.—Shuttle/Centaur G-prime processing at Kennedy 
Space Center (CISS also shown at right). 
with the payload/spacecraft and the CISS filled the entire 
cargo bay of the space shuttle. The two space shuttle orbiters 
designated to carry Centaur, Challenger and Atlantis, also had 
to be modified for Centaur. These modifications included 
provisions for filling and draining the Centaur propellant 
tanks, venting the tanks, and dumping the tanks in the event of 
an abort landing. Figure 8 shows the first Centaur G-prime 
vehicle being processed for launch at KSC. The CISS can be 
seen in the at the bottom of the lower photograph. 
There were many design changes and modifications  
required for Centaur G and G-prime. The launch environment 
of the space shuttle was totally different than that of Atlas and 
Titan. Significant human rating requirements had to be 
addressed. The RL10 rocket engine had to be able to transition 
to the new Centaur design and shuttle environments with 
minimal changes. This included accommodating space shuttle 
environments, operating constraints, launch loads, different 
propellant mixture ratios, prelaunch cooling replaced with 
multirevolution/on-orbit chill-down, and accommodating new 
Centaur interfaces for the propulsion system. 
Other Centaur design changes included 
 
x New propellant tank diameters and lengths 
x New conical transition to the LH2 tank 
x New propellant fill, drain, and dump system 
x New separation disconnects to separate the Centaur from 
the CISS and the shuttle 
x New aft adapter and separation ring 
x New forward adapter 
x New S-band transmitter and RF system compatible with 
the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System  
x Added system and component redundancies 
x New propellant isolation prevalves 
x Ability to handle multiday on-orbit operations 
 
From a vehicle design and integration standpoint, these 
technical design changes and interfaces were minor compared 
to the multitude of organizational interfaces. The organiza-
tional interfaces for Shuttle/Centaur included mission 
management, the Air Force, payload customers, NASA HQ, 
JSC, KSC, and finally the industrial contractors. The complex-
ity of all these organizational interfaces was further com-
pounded because most of these interfaces were 
“authoritative,” meaning they had the power to influence or 
stop the progress of the overall mission (Ref. 13). Relation-
ships and interfaces with JSC were particularly challenging. 
Part of the problem was that GRC was given leadership 
responsibility of a key element of the Space Transportation 
System, rather than MSFC. GRC was an outsider in the NASA 
world of human spaceflight. Another issue, as mentioned 
earlier, was that Centaur ultimately was managed as, and 
treated by JSC as, a shuttle payload, rather than an element of 
the shuttle program. Centaur had to be designed to meet the 
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requirements and criteria of a shuttle payload, which were 
vastly different than an element. 
At the time the Shuttle/Centaur program was canceled in 
1986 approximately a billion dollars had been spent, and two 
sets of flight articles (Centaur G-prime and CISS for SC-1 and 
SC-2), two G vehicles (approximately 50 percent complete), 
and one ground-test article were produced. The space shuttle 
did not return to flight until September 1988. The Galileo 
mission to Jupiter was eventually launched in October 1989 
using the less powerful IUS inside Space Shuttle Atlantis. The 
European Ulysses spacecraft was not launched until October 
1990, also using the IUS, from Space Shuttle Discovery. A 
modified version of the Centaur G-prime ended up flying 16 
times from 1994 to 2003 as the upper stage on the Air Force’s 
Titan IV. This marked the return of Titan/Centaur, 17 years 
after the Voyager launches. Ironically, NASA decided to 
launch the Cassini mission to Saturn on a Titan IV/Centaur  
G-prime in 1997. The Cassini spacecraft was the last ELV 
payload integrated, managed, and launched by GRC.  
During the four main years of the Shuttle/Centaur program 
(1983 to 1986), GRC continued to manage and launch 
Atlas/Centaur. The Shuttle/Centaur Project Office existed in 
parallel with the Atlas/Centaur Project Office. Both project 
offices received launch vehicle engineering support from the 
Space Transportation Engineering Division, led by  
Steve Szabo. The two project offices and the engineering 
division were all within the Space Directorate at GRC. Total 
launch vehicle staffing at GRC during this period reached 
nearly 250 people. 
Separate from the major Centaur stage configuration chang-
es (Atlas, Titan, Shuttle), GRC also co-led with industry other 
aspects of Centaur stage development and subsequent changes 
to the Centaur stage to improve performance and operability. 
In the 1960s, GRC led and performed structural tests for the 
Centaur equipment module, performed zero-gravity drop 
tower tests to better understand propellant behavior in low 
gravity, and developed a capacitance probe propellant 
utilization system to measure the propellant in the Centaur 
tanks. GRC engineers also developed a balanced thrust vent 
system to enable venting of the propellant tanks during in-
space coast phases. In the 1970s, GRC was instrumental in the 
development of the Teledyne flight computer and flight 
software, the Honeywell guidance system, and a digital 
autopilot. In the 1980s, GRC led the elimination of the 
jettisonable insulation panels on the Centaur liquid hydrogen 
tank. The panels were replaced with fixed foam insulation. 
Also in the 1980s specifically for the AC-62 “stretched” Atlas 
G configuration (1984), GRC both eliminated the hydrogen-
peroxide-powered boost pumps that increased propellant inlet 
pressures for the RL10 engines and performed numerous 
RL10 engine performance improvements, including engine 
thrust and specific impulse increases. For example, a silver  
 
 
Figure 9.—AC-62 during prelaunch test at Launch
Complex 36B (photographed by the author).
 
throat insert was added to the RL10 engine to increase 
expansion ratio and specific impulse. GRC also led the 
development of a new hydrazine-based reaction control 
system for AC-62. The previous system used hydrogen 
peroxide. Unfortunately, with all these changes to Atlas and 
Centaur in 1984, the AC-62 launch was a failure due to a 
Centaur oxygen leak in the intermediate bulkhead that was 
believed to have occurred during Centaur’s separation from 
Atlas. Figure 9 shows the AC-62 vehicle during a prelaunch 
test at Launch Complex 36B at Cape Canaveral Air Force 
Station. 
GRC’s launch vehicle development efforts and accom-
plishments were not limited to the Centaur stage. The same 
roles, responsibilities, expertise, and philosophy that GRC 
brought to Centaur applied equally to the Atlas booster and its 
MA-5 propulsion system. GRC personnel had the same 
relationship and partnership with the industry contractors for 
Atlas (General Dynamics) and MA-5 (Rocketdyne), as they 
did with Centaur. Some of the Atlas launch vehicle develop-
ments and configuration changes that GRC led included 
 
x Structural strength testing at GRC’s Plum Brook E-stand 
of a full-scale Atlas D tank to demonstrate buckling 
strength capability and bending strength (in the 1960s) 
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x Development of the SLV-3C Atlas with stretched pro-
pellant tanks (in 1966) 
x Development of the stretched Atlas G for AC-62 (in 
1984). Atlas G was 81 inches longer than the previous 
Atlas configuration 
x Development of the Atlas H configuration for DoD 
launches from Vandenberg Air Force Base 
x Development of numerous Atlas MA-5 propulsion 
system upgrades (1963 to 1989), including booster and 
sustainer engine thrust increase, elimination of the ver-
nier roll-control engines, and a computerized Atlas pro-
pellant loading system 
5.0 Other LeRC ELV Leadership 
Accomplishments 
The Challenger accident in 1986 changed everything. 
NASA realized putting all its eggs into the space shuttle 
basket was a mistake; the country became too dependent on 
the space shuttle at a time when foreign countries (i.e., 
Europe’s Ariane) were taking over the ELV market and 
commercial space business. Further, NASA realized that 
risking human lives on space missions that did not require 
humans was unwise. In December 1986, President Reagan 
issued a directive stipulating that NASA would no longer 
launch satellites for private companies or foreign govern-
ments, unless they required a human presence in space or 
involved national security. This decision took the shuttle out 
of competition with ELVs for revenue-generating business 
(Ref. 14). The idea of maintaining a “mixed fleet” of ELVs of 
various sizes and payload capabilities emerged in 1987 when 
NASA’s Mixed Fleet Study was completed. GRC chaired the 
procurement development team for this study. Soon after this, 
in 1988, the concept of buying launch services instead of 
launch vehicles emerged. GRC was at the forefront of this 
transition. 
Up until this time, NASA bought ELVs and was responsible 
for integrating them with payloads and launching them. For 
example, with Atlas/Centaur, GRC had separate contracts with 
General Dynamics for the Atlas and Centaur vehicles, Pratt & 
Whitney for the RL10 engines, Rocketdyne for the Atlas MA-
5 engines, Teledyne for the Centaur flight computer, and 
Honeywell for the Centaur guidance system. GRC was 
responsible for taking delivery of all of these hardware 
elements and integrating them together with General Dynam-
ics into the final integrated vehicle. Pratt & Whitney, Rock-
etdyne, Teledyne, and Honeywell were not subcontractors to 
General Dynamics. They were referred to as associate 
contractors. Their contracts were with GRC and they delivered 
their products to GRC. GRC then transferred these delivera-
bles as GFE to General Dynamics, who performed the overall 
vehicle integration and tests. GRC was also responsible for 
integrating the payload and supporting KSC in launching the 
rockets from Air-Force-owned launch pads. GRC also owned 
the RL10 test stands at Pratt & Whitney. NASA was responsi-
ble for the launch and the mission success. If there was a 
failure, NASA was responsible for the failure reviews. If a 
private company or another government agency wanted to 
launch their satellite on Atlas/Centaur, they had to approach 
GRC to procure and integrate the vehicle and manage the 
launch. This was the era of ELVs, from 1963 to 1989. 
In 1987 the transition to launch services began. NASA 
would no longer buy vehicles, but would contract with 
commercial launch vehicle providers to buy their service to 
launch a particular payload into space. The launch vehicle 
provider became responsible for everything. In the case of 
Atlas/Centaur; Rocketdyne, Pratt & Whitney, Honeywell, and 
Teledyne became subcontractors to General Dynamics. All of 
the NASA-owned property, equipment, and other assets was 
turned over to industry as part of a barter agreement in 
exchange for launching the Combined Release and Radiation 
Effects Satellite (CRRES) on AC-69. This barter agreement 
was an element (condition) of the Geosynchronous Operation-
al Environmental Satellite (GOES) launch services contract 
negotiation. GOES became NASA’s first commercial launch 
services contract and represented a milestone in the effort to 
commercialize the launch vehicle industry (Ref. 15). AC-68, 
launched on September 25, 1989, carrying a FLTSATCOM 
satellite, was the last GRC-managed and -integrated mission 
of the “launch vehicle” era. GRC had managed 112 launches 
over a 26-year period. From this point forward, NASA would 
purchase launch services rather than launch vehicles. Staffing 
levels at GRC for launch services support dropped to 50 to 70 
people. In July 1990, the first commercial launch of a NASA 
mission occurred with the launch of CRRES on AC-69. The 
new era of commercial space and launch services had begun. 
The barter agreement paved the way for the commercialization 
of Atlas/Centaur. It continues to this day with Centaur still 
flying as the upper stage of Atlas, now referred to as Atlas V. 
A very similar upper stage flies atop the Delta 4 launch 
vehicle. Today there are many other commercial launch 
providers, including Orbital Science, SpaceX, and United 
Launch Alliance (ULA, a Boeing/Lockheed Martin joint 
venture). Ariane continues to fly for Europe, as do ELVs from 
other foreign countries including Japan and Russia. In 2012 
ULA celebrated the 200th flight of Centaur. ULA is currently 
developing the next generation of Centaur. It is perhaps ironic 
and remarkable to note that while Centaur still flies today, the 
space shuttle (which almost caused the termination of Centaur 
and ELVs) does not. 
During the 1990s, the first decade of launch services, GRC 
was responsible for procuring launch services for intermediate 
and large ELVs (i.e., Atlas/Centaur and Titan). Although these 
were launch services, GRC still maintained some responsibili-
ties including independent verification and validation (IV&V), 
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leading-edge integration, independent analyses, mission design 
analyses, flight readiness assessments, supported spacecraft 
integration, and any NASA mission unique or peculiar require-
ments. For example, the Earth Observing System (EOS) AM-1 
spacecraft had several mission-peculiar requirements that drove 
significant modifications to the baseline vehicle, including a 
new extended payload fairing, unique payload adapter and 
separation system, and a strengthened Centaur equipment 
module for the heavy and larger EOS payload. The EOS AM-1 
spacecraft was originally designed to launch on the much more 
powerful Titan launch vehicle. When the change was made for 
budgetary reasons to launch on Atlas/Centaur, the spacecraft 
had to be downsized, but it still ended up being an unusually 
large and heavy payload for Atlas/Centaur. GRC performed all 
of the IV&V analyses of the new designs, the structural test 
program, and the combined spacecraft/launch vehicle environ-
ment. EOS AM-1 was launched in December 1999 from a new 
Atlas launch complex (SLC-3E) at Vandenberg Air Force Base. 
This was the very first launch of an Atlas with a Centaur upper 
stage from Vandenberg. Other missions that GRC supported 
during this decade included CRRES (AC-69), Mars Observer 
(Titan III), GOES (AC-73, AC-77), SOHO (AC-121), and 
Cassini (Titan IV/Centaur). 
In managing ELV launch services, GRC employed a variety 
of matrixed analysis capabilities to verify and validate mission 
planning and launch preparations. Typical activities included 
loads analyses, dynamics analyses, stability and control 
analyses, flight software IV&V, guidance analyses, and 
trajectory/performance analyses. These independent analyses 
in critical or high-risk areas, using independently derived 
mathematical models, were then compared with the contrac-
tor’s results. In 1998, a NASA “Zero Base Review” directed 
that all NASA ELV programs be transferred to KSC. This 
included GRC’s responsibilities for intermediate- and large-
class ELV launch services (i.e., Atlas/Centaur and Titan), as 
well as Goddard Space Flight Center’s responsibility for small 
and medium class ELV launch services (i.e., Delta). This 
marked the end of GRC’s long, 35-year association with 
Centaur and ELVs. 
GRC led the creation of a new contractual means for the 
government to launch spacecraft. The transition from “launch 
vehicle” to “launch services,” where NASA contracts with 
industry following 30+ years of maturation of ELVs, enabled 
the government to streamline and pursue a cost-effective way to 
launch spacecraft by purchasing a service rather than the actual 
hardware. GRC pioneered the commercial launch services 
culture and was the first to implement the new national space 
policy on commercialization through innovative contracting 
provisions that have become the standard for NASA and DoD. 
GRC’s pioneering launch services methods enabled NASA to 
retain technical insight while keeping costs low.  
6.0 Thoughts on the Future 
It is hard to imagine today a program or project being 
managed and integrated like Centaur was. Times have 
changed, the environment is different, the industry has 
matured, and the roles of government and industry have 
evolved. A trusting, collaborative relationship between 
government and industry, like Centaur enjoyed, may be a relic 
of the past, but it is nevertheless something to strive for. The 
basic tenets of GRC’s launch vehicle management philosophy 
are sound and relevant today: strong leadership; highly 
competent staff with deep technical knowledge, experience, 
and tools; well-defined roles and responsibilities, processes, 
and procedures; and a profound drive for mission success. The 
government’s role needs to be more than just insight and 
oversight of the contractor. The “deep technical knowledge” 
of the staff needs to be allowed access to the contractor’s 
design, development, production, and operations. This 
penetration need not be adversarial but rather in a spirit of 
collaboration, teamwork, and mutual trust for the common 
good of the mission—a “win-win” situation. This proposition 
will lead to much debate and many questions. Is this expen-
sive, bureaucratic, unnecessary overkill? Shouldn’t the 
government step back and stay out of industry’s way? Isn’t 
this “old school” and contrary to commercialization? Does the 
government (NASA) even have the personnel with deep 
technical knowledge and experience anymore? These are all 
valid questions that need to be thoughtfully considered by 
leaders, stakeholders, and customers.  
What is the next Centaur? There are many launch vehicles 
and space transportation systems flying successfully today. 
SpaceX, with their Falcon launch vehicles and Dragon 
capsule, is one example. NASA’s Space Launch System heavy 
lift booster and Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle are well 
into their development. Future in-space transportation systems 
likely will be higher performing than Centaur or any other 
chemical propulsion stage or spacecraft. Nuclear thermal 
propulsion with its high specific impulse and high thrust or 
solar electric propulsion (SEP) with its very high specific 
impulse (and low thrust) are being considered for future solar 
system missions and destinations, such as Mars and for the 
Asteroid Redirect Mission. The lessons learned from Centaur, 
and there are many, should be heeded as well as the tech-
niques and philosophy employed by GRC. 
GRC is leading the development of SEP and in-space SEP 
transfer stages/spacecraft development. As revolutionary as 
Centaur was in the 1960s in terms of high-energy performance 
and new capability development to enable new missions, SEP 
is this generation’s Centaur. Hopefully some of the manage-
ment and integration tenets for Centaur will be applied to SEP 
and other future space transportation systems. 
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7.0 Conclusion 
The success and longevity of Centaur can be attributed to 
GRC’s strong leadership, technical competency, and manage-
ment philosophy for launch vehicle integration. Although this 
paper is about GRC’s role, one should not undervalue the role 
of General Dynamics and the other industry partners that 
equally share in the success of Centaur. It was a true team 
effort and collaboration. Although GRC managed and led the 
launch vehicle integration, as well as the development of the 
Centaur upper stage, the work was largely done by a team of 
industry partners under contract to GRC. However, GRC did 
far more than just manage the contracts and provide oversight 
and insight. The GRC launch vehicle team worked side-by-
side with their industry counterparts on almost all aspects of 
Centaur development and integration, including the major 
configuration changes described in this paper. The GRC team 
had longevity, continuity, and the corporate knowledge of 
launch vehicles and Centaur. GRC’s knowledge of every 
detail of Centaur, down to individual components such as 
valves and fasteners, sometimes exceeded that of industry. 
Both GRC and industry personnel had immense pride in 
Centaur and their contributions to its success. Each launch 
culminated a multiyear “intimate relationship” life cycle with 
that particular vehicle. Each vehicle had its own unique 
history, pedigree, and problems to overcome that the team 
lived and breathed every day. It was exhilarating when the 
launch was successful and devastating when the launch ended 
in failure. Centaur continues to be the workhorse, high-energy 
upper stage for the nation. Go Atlas. Go Centaur. 
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